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INTRODUCTION
Recent accounting scandals and perceived audit failures have resulted in criticism of the accounting and auditing professions in the financial press for their alleged role in allowing these situations to evolve. Part of this denunciation has been leveled at firms' external auditors and expresses disdain at the presumably substandard work that was completed for their audit clients ostensibly at the expense of the public good. This has spawned an exceptional amount of interest in the accounting and auditing profession with substantial scrutiny being directed upon auditor independence issues. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued Final Rule S7-13-00,
Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements (hereafter RuleS7) which
requires disclosure of audit and non-audit fees on all proxy statements issued after February 5, 2001 . The SEC argues that such disclosures help "shed light on the independence of public companies' auditors" (SEC 2000) .
As a result of these disclosures, concerns have been articulated in the financial press about the magnitude of non-audit fees being paid annually to a firm's external auditors. Nonaudit fees encompass all fees not directly charged to the audit including systems implementation, systems modification, tax preparation, consultation fees, and internal audit fees. Prior to the newly mandated disclosures of actual non-audit fee data, the SEC estimated that 25% of public companies purchased non-audit services from incumbent auditors (Abbott et al. 2001) . However, the new SEC-required disclosures revealed that in the year 2000, virtually all public companies (96%) purchased non-audit services from their auditors. Furthermore, these non-audit services typically represented material amounts with 51% of companies paying more for non-audit services than audit services (Abbott et al. 2001) . The pervasiveness and extent of these material economic alignments between a firm and its external auditor has led many financial statements users (and regulators) to be concerned about the level of audit quality that actually exists, and correspondingly, to become apprehensive about the auditor's veritable independence. Such concerns prompted recent legislation designed to, among other things, prohibit certain nonaudit services to audit clients. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 identifies and prohibits nine specific nonaudit services believed to be incompatible with audit services. The Act also established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board that has the ability to prohibit other nonaudit services deemed inappropriate.
Despite recent legislation, it is not clear that non-audit services negatively affect auditor independence in fact (Ashbaugh et al. 2003 , Chung and Kallapur 2003 , Defond et al. 2002 , Francis and Ke 2002 , Frankel et al. 2002 , Geiger and Raghunandan 2003 , Reynolds et al. 2003 .
A related, and equally important, issue that remains unresolved involves the effects that nonaudit services have on the appearance of independence. Early research investigating the effects of non-audit services on the appearance of independence yielded mixed results; however, some recent findings suggest that non-audit services may impair user perceptions of independence (e.g. Glezen and Millar 1985 , Lowe and Pany 1995 , 1996 , Jenkins and Krawczyk 2002 , Frankel et al. 2002 , Hackenbrack and Elms 2002 , Raghunandan 2003 , Francis and Ke 2003 .
Our research empirically explores the effects that non-audit services performed by a firm's external auditors have on perceived auditor independence in the bond market. While bond market research often complements and reinforces research performed in the equity markets, the results can differ due to the underlying diversity in the nature of the stakeholders and their contingent claims on the firm. Equity stakeholders are primarily interested in the unspecified return they will earn from dividends and price appreciation of shares. They are the recipients of the residual earnings after all other claims are paid by the firm. This unlimited upside potential can result in a willingness to engage in high risk projects. Bondholders, in contrast, because their maximum return has been established and defined by the terms of the debt agreement, are primarily interested in protecting the firm's ability to make scheduled interest and principle payments. While management serves the interests of shareholders, the interests of debt-holders are not management's prime consideration. This is referred to by Penman (2004) as the "moral hazard" of debt which can result in decisions having differential effects on each constituency.
This makes the bond market potentially different than the equity market and, therefore, an interesting and important environment in which to examine issues that are significant to the accounting and auditing professions.
Bond ratings provide a particularly useful capital market setting in which to examine the effects of non-audit fees paid to external auditors. Information contained in firm financial statements is critical to the fundamental analysis that bond raters undertake when assigning a specific rating to a firm's bond issue. Indeed, bond raters utilize various ratio guidelines based on profitability and leverage measures that are generally necessary for a firm to achieve in order to attain a particular bond rating (Standard & Poor's Corporate Rating Criteria 2002) . The bond raters do not develop the financial numbers themselves, but utilize and depend upon the financial statements that are certified by the external auditor. The bond rating is critically important to the firm, in part, because the difference of a single rating category (e.g. Baa vs. Ba) can often mean a 100 basis point differential in yield. For a 20 year $400 million bond issue this translates into an $80 million difference in interest payments. Information providing direct or indirect evidence concerning the underlying credibility of the firm's audited financial statements is of utmost importance to these bond rating agencies whose very existence depends upon their ability to provide unbiased evaluations of firm default risk.
We utilize several proxies for auditor independence that have been established in the literature (see Defond et al. 2002 , Francis and Ke 2002 , Frankel et al. 2002 , Geiger and Raghunandan 2003 , Ashbaugh et al. 2003 to investigate what effects, if any, the magnitude and relative degree of non-audit services have on the bond rating process. Our principal regression results indicate that the level of non-audit services provided by a firm's external auditors is negatively associated with that client's bond rating. While we find a significant and consistent statistical effect with our regression analyses that remains after several robustness checks, we are unable to demonstrate any improvement in bond rating classification accuracy when non-audit service fees are added to a benchmark prediction model. Thus, while this evidence indicates non-audit service fees are negatively associated with a firm's bond rating, we can not validate a substantive economic effect by demonstrating changes in the actual rating assigned to a debt issue by bond rating analysts. Overall, these results contribute to the existing literature by affording empirical insights into bond rating analysts' perceptions of auditor independence and provide evidence regarding the role that audit and non-audit service fees play in establishing a firm's bond rating.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two establishes the necessary background, contains a review of relevant audit-related prior literature, and provides a literature review and brief background with reference to the bond rating area. Section three describes the hypotheses development. Section four describes the research design and sample selection process. Section five provides the results along with discussion. The final section summarizes and concludes the paper.
BACKGROUND

Non-Audit Service Fees and Auditor Independence
RuleS7 defines independence as "a mental state of objectivity and lack of bias" (SEC 2000, Section I). Due to the fact that mental states are, by definition, unobservable, RuleS7 also stresses the importance of independence in appearance. RuleS7 states, "Public faith in the reliability of a corporation's financial statements depends upon the public perception of the outside auditor as an independent professional. If investors were to view the auditor as an advocate for the corporate client, the value of the audit function itself might well be lost" (SEC 2000, Section III.A).
Auditor independence, both in fact and appearance, has long been recognized as an important aspect of audit quality (DeAngelo 1981a).
1 Previous literature generally supports the contention that equity market participant's value audit quality (Franz et al. 1998 , Moreland 1995 , Teoh and Wong 1993 Scheiner, 1984; Glezen and Millar, 1985; Antle et al. 1997) .
A related and more recent stream of research investigates whether non-audit fees impair independence in fact (Defond et al. 2002 , Francis and Ke 2002 , Frankel et al. 2002 , Ashbaugh et al 2003 , Chung and Kallapur 2003 , Geiger and Raghunandan 2003 , Reynolds et al. 2003 . Frankel et al. (2002) find that non-audit fees are positively related to companies beating analysts'
forecasts as well as the magnitude of discretionary accruals. However, subsequent research suggests that the results of Frankel et al. (2002) are sensitive to choices in research design and fail to replicate their results (Francis and Ke 2002 , Ashbaugh et al. 2003 , Chung and Kallapur 2003 , Reynolds et al. 2003 . Moreover, further research has failed to find evidence that non-audit fees impair auditor independence where independence is proxied for by the propensity to issue modified audit opinions (Defond et al. 2002, Geiger and Raghunandan 2003) . In general, this research provides little evidence to suggest that auditors providing non-audit services to audit clients impairs auditor independence in fact.
An alternative stream of research suggests that non-audit fees can impair the perception of audit independence. Several experimental studies utilizing professional decision makers show that the perception of auditor independence is negatively affected by material business relationships with client companies (e.g. Lowe and Pany 1995 , 1996 , Swanger and Chewning 2001 . In addition, several empirical studies examine the reaction of equity market participants to the disclosure of auditor fees. Frankel et al. (2002) use an event study methodology and find evidence of a negative stock price reaction to the unexpected portion of non-audit fees, but not the level of these fees. The authors are careful to point out that the effect is small in economic terms. Ashbaugh et al. (2003) perform similar analyses, but extend the research design to control for other information disclosed in proxy statements. They find no evidence that the market reacts to the information contained in the ratio of non-audit fees to total fees collected by the firm's auditor. Raghunandan (2003) investigates stockholder voting to approve incumbent auditors. His results indicate that voting to ratify the auditor is negatively associated with the level of nonaudit services provided, but similar to Frankel et al (2002) , the effect is very small in economic terms. Raghunandan concludes that the majority of shareholders do not perceive non-audit services to impair independence. Francis and Ke (2003) report that the market valuation of earnings surprises is significantly lower for firms that exceed $500,000 in non-audit fees and also pay more for non-audit services than the audit. Contrary to many recent studies, they find the economic impact to be substantial with a 77 percent reduction in the market valuation of earnings surprises. Finally, Hackenbrack and Elms (2002) revisit the ASR 250 fee disclosures and find a negative association between stock returns and non-audit fees for sample companies with the highest ratio of non-audit fees. In summary, while these findings suggest the existence of a negative association between the relative amount of non-audit fees and perceived audit quality, most studies find the effect appears to be small in economic terms.
While evidence exists investigating the effects of non-audit fees on equity prices, no direct evidence has been provided concerning potential debt market effects. Bondholders are primarily interested in the level of default risk faced by the firm. Because bondholders have different contingent claims on the firm than equity shareholders, evidence regarding debt market effects is important in obtaining a comprehensive view of the capital markets. Our study contributes to the extant literature by providing empirical evidence regarding the effects of audit and non-audit service fees on bond rating analysts' perceptions of auditor's independence. Debt markets, specifically bond ratings, are particularly well suited for examining auditor independence issues related to financial statement information because bond rating analysts directly depend upon the audited financial data to conduct their fundamental firm analysis to assist them in predicting the probability of a particular firm making required payments on time.
Our research provides an examination of audit and non-audit fees on the determination of a firm's debt rating.
Importance of Bond Ratings
Bonds provide a critical mechanism for companies to raise funds to finance new and continuing activities and projects. Corporations raise substantially more capital in the bond market each year than they do in the equity market. In addition to the implications regarding interest yield, there are also many regulatory requirements in the U.S.A. and abroad that are specified in terms of a firm's assigned bond rating. A long list of agencies allow investments to be made only in the top four rating categories (e.g. Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa), typically referred to as "Investment Grade" debt. 2 The fact that regulatory agencies define requirements partially based on independent ratings indicates the importance and degree to which the rating process is ingrained in the market system.
There is also substantial empirical evidence in the finance and accounting literature that establishes the importance and information content of bond ratings and changes in bond ratings.
The most obvious, and arguably most important, is the effect bond ratings have on bond yields and consequently the firm's cost of debt capital. Ziebart and Reiter (1992) demonstrate that bond ratings directly affect bond yields. Other research demonstrates the effect bond ratings and bond rating changes have on firm equity prices. Ederington et al. (1987) find that bond ratings provide addition information to the market above and beyond a set of accounting variables. Evidence has indicated the downgrades in bond ratings are associated with negative abnormal stock returns (Holthhausen and Leftwich 1986). Furthermore, bond and stock prices react to firms being placed on Standard & Poor's Credit Watch List (often a preliminary step to a rating change), as well as actual upgrades and downgrades in the ratings (Hand et al. 1993 ). Goh and Ederington (1993) further examine stock price reactions to bond rating downgrades. They find that rating downgrades due to an increase in leverage of the firm results in no stock price reaction while downgrades due to deterioration in the firm's prospects results in a negative stock price reaction.
Analyst's revision of earnings forecasts following ratings downgrades appear to be a reaction to the downgrades themselves (Ederington and Goh 1998) . Further research finds that firms receiving rating upgrades outperform firms receiving downgrades by 10 to 14 percent in common stock performance in the year following the bond rating change (Dichev and Piotroski 2001) . Furthermore, they report that current ratings changes predict not only future rating changes, but also changes in the firm's future profitability. These studies show clearly that both the stock and bond markets react in a manner that indicates bond ratings convey important information regarding the value of the firm and its prospects of being able to repay its debt obligations as scheduled.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Although substantial research has been completed in the bond rating area, no previously published research has examined the effects of audit quality on industrial bonds. There is one study that suggests audit quality is associated with municipal bond ratings. Allen (1994) uses auditor size (Big 8 vs. Non-Big 8) as a proxy for audit quality and finds accounting information associated with Big 8 audits is able to accurately predict municipal bond ratings. Conversely, accounting information associated with non-Big 8 audits is unable to achieve prediction results better than those expected by random chance. Our objective in this current study is to expand the understanding of perceived audit quality with respect to the bond market by examining the effects that the relative degree and magnitude of non-audit fees have on the actual bond rating assigned by bond rating analysts. The consequences of negative or questionable perceived audit quality on financial statement users have been well documented in previous literature (e.g. Teoh and Wong 1993 , Allen 1994 , Franz et al. 1998 . One aspect of perceived audit quality is perceived auditor independence. If financial statement users perceive the provision of non-audit services to impair auditor independence, then they are likely to impose a cost-of-capital premium for information risk associated with their inability to rely on the audit (Firth 1997; Johnstone et al. 2001) . A cost-of-capital premium suggests a negative association between the provision of non-audit services and bond ratings, given the inverse relationship established between bond ratings and bond yields.
To investigate the effects of perceived auditor independence on bond ratings we construct several proxies established in the literature (e.g. Defond et al. 2002 , Francis and Ke 2002 , Frankel et al. 2002 using RuleS7 disclosures. Specifically, three alternative fee measure representations are added in various combinations to a benchmark model of bond ratings: (1) the ratio of non-audit fees paid to the incumbent auditor to total fees paid to the auditor (FeeRatio),
(2) the log of total service fees paid by the client to the external auditor (TotFee), and (3) a decomposition of total fees broken into the log of non-audit service fees (NonAud) and the log of audit fees (AudFee). These fee variables represent observable proxies for auditor independence.
Utilizing these measures we investigate the general assertion that high levels of non-audit services lead to lower bond ratings. The basic hypothesis (in alternative form) can be represented as follows:
The amount of non-audit service fees paid to the firm's external auditor is negatively associated with a firm's bond rating.
We investigate this hypothesis by employing the three non-audit fee measures. The first measure (FeeRatio) offers empirical evidence related to the SEC's goal of providing investors information which will allow them to determine "whether the proportion of fees for audit and non-audit services causes them to question the auditor's independence" (SEC 2000, Section III.c.5). The second measure (TotFee) provides insight concerning the magnitude of the economic bond that exists between the firm and its auditor, and its influence on the determination of the firm's bond rating. While non-audit fees are the focus of our study, DeAngelo (1981b) argues that nonzero auditor switching costs will result in auditors receiving economic rents for audit services.
Following this argument, it is reasonable that high total fees could lead to a decline in perceived auditor independence. Finally, the third set of measures (NonAud and AudFee) directly examines the effects that each of the components of total fees has on the firm's bond rating.
RESEARCH METHOD
Model Specification
Modeling of bond ratings has a long history beginning with the seminal work done in the area by Fisher (1959) and extended by various studies (e.g. Horrigan 1966 , Pogue and Soldofsky 1969 , West 1970 , Pinches and Mingo 1973 , 1975 . Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) , hereafter KU, continued this stream of research by comprehensively examining alternative prediction models and techniques. They conclude that statistical techniques that exploit the ordinal nature of bond ratings such as probit or logistic regression are theoretically superior and econometrically more sound than methods that are not designed to accommodate ordinal dependant variables.
Subsequent studies have attempted to outperform KU, but none have proven to be clearly superior with most correctly predicting approximately 65% of the ratings (e.g. Belkaoui 1980 , Ederington 1985 , Iskander and Emery 1994 . The KU model continues to remain robust in the literature and has been utilized directly or with minor variations in recent research as the primary reference for modeling bond ratings (e.g. , Graham et al. 2001 , Ziebart and Reiter 1992 , Shi 2003 .
Consequently, the KU model is chosen as the foundation model for our investigation in This base model is augmented with several additional control variables to help ensure a rigorous test of the added non-audit fee measures. Based on evidence provided in Maher (1987) and Graham et al. (2001) , we add a net pension variable to control for effects of a firm's defined benefit retirement obligations. Higher net pension liabilities are consistent with lower bond ratings. We also add industry indicator variables to control for any systematic industry rating differences. In addition, following DeFond et al. (2002) who model audit and non-audit fees in their research, we incorporate additional variables know to be related to total audit fees in order to minimize the possibility of significant results being caused by correlated omitted variables.
Finally, the audit and non-audit fee measures described previously (i.e., FeeRatio, TotFee, and AudFee-NonAud) are added to the benchmark model in various combinations to determine their importance in the bond rating process. The primary analysis involves an examination of the significance of the coefficient of the added variable. Finding a significant coefficient is consistent with the theory indicating that variable is an important factor in the bond rating decision process. 
β 1 through β 9 represent the bond rating control variables, while β 10 through β 21 represent variables know to be related to total audit fees 3 . These variables are defined in Table 1 , Panel C, and more fully explained in Defond et al. (2002) . β 22 is a generalized representation of the fee measures which are our proxies for auditor independence. Congruent with previous bond rating research, the variables TotAsset, Income, LtDebt, and NetPen are all five year averages in order to prevent one year fluctuations from inaccurately portraying the long-term economics of the firm that are important to bond holders.
(Insert Table 1 here)
Sample Development
The dataset development began with all new unsecured corporate bonds issued by non- examined distressed firms. Our sample tends to have higher levels of FeeRatios and higher levels of audit and non-audit fees. This is likely due in part to the size of the firms in our sample which contains a higher percentage of larger firms than other recent samples. Table 1 reveals that the minimum FeeRatio observation is close to zero (7 % of total fees) while the maximum is 94%.
Most of the firms in our sample purchase substantial non-audit services from their auditor, with a mean (median) FeeRatio of 62% (64%). Consistent with previous research, most sample firms pay more for non-audit services than for the financial statement audits. In fact, over 70 percent of our sample paid more for non-audit services than for audit services. The actual total fees range from $200,000 to $96 million with a mean (median) of just under $10 ($4.11) million. Audit fees range from a low of $90,000 to $48 million with a mean (median) of $2.45 ($1.24) million. Nonaudit fees range from $50,000 to $80 million and have a mean (median) of $7.48 ($2.65) million.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Regression Results
The results of the ordered logistic regression analyses for the overall sample are shown in Table 2 . The first results column displays the benchmark model, while the remaining four columns present models that include the audit and non-audit fee measures that proxy for auditor independence. All the models in Table 2 have a Pseudo-R 2 greater than 78% with p-values less than .0001 indicating a robust job of representing the bond rating process.
(Insert Table 2 here)
The most notable elements relate to our variables that represent the non-audit fees paid to the firm's external auditors. Model 2 of Table 2 includes the FeeRatio which is statistically significant (p = .0011) and negatively associated with a firm's bond rating. This provides support for our hypothesis and is consistent with the interpretation that bond rating analysts acknowledge the relative proportion of non-audit fees to total fees that a firm purchases from their external auditors and incorporate this information into the bond rating process as a significant concern.
Stated differently, firms that purchase relatively higher levels of non-audit services to audit services from their external auditors, ceteris paribus, appear to receive lower bond ratings than firms that purchase relatively few non-audit services.
To further examine our hypothesis we add total fees to the benchmark model resulting in
Model 3 and find the TotFee measure to be negative and highly significant (p = .0001). This is consistent with bond rating analysts incorporating the total amount of all fees paid to the external auditor as a negative factor when assigning a firm's bond rating. This provides further support for the main hypothesis and supplies some evidence that bond rating analysts evaluate the audit quality and the perceived independence of external auditors that receive substantial amounts of revenue from their audit clients.
The Finally, we decompose total fees paid into NonAud and AudFee to simultaneously test the importance of both non-audit and audit fees in the bond rating process. These results, shown in Model 5, indicate that NonAud is significant and negative (p = .0001), but AudFee is not significant (p = .6208). These results suggest that of total fees paid to external auditors, non-audit service fees alone appears to be the primary driver behind the significance of the TotFee variable. Overall, the results displayed in Table 2 are consistent with the explanation that the amount of fees paid to the external auditor is an important consideration in the bond rating decision process. Moreover, the non-audit fees paid to the auditor appear to be the driving component of the fee measures.
Alternative Fee Measure Representations
To further examine the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the equations from Table   2 using alternative representations of the non-audit fee measures. First, instead of taking the natural log of audit fees, non-audit fees, and total fees; we scale the audit and non-audit fee measures by total assets of the company. This representation provides a scaled measure of how large the fees are in relation to the audited company, and, thus, affords a standardized crosssectional gauge of the monetary level. The basic results (not tabulated) reveal the same fundamental relationships shown in Table 2 . The non-audit fee measures remain significant in the bond rating estimation equation with the total fee measure dominating the fee ratio.
Furthermore, the non-audit fee measure remains the significant component of the total fee decomposition.
We next estimate the unexpected portion of the non-audit fee measures for the 2001 disclosures by following the work of Defond et al. (2002) . We model the non-audit fees in a first stage regression and obtain a residual value representing the unexpected portion of the non-audit fees. We then utilize this unexpected (surprise) portion of the non-audit fees in a second stage bond rating estimation model. The results (untabulated) remain consistent with those displayed in Table 2 indicating unexpected total fees are significant in the bond rating process and subsume the fee ratio measure. The surprise portion of the non-audit fees also remain the significant component of the total fees paid to the external auditor. As a whole, these additional analyses reinforce the primary findings of Table 2 and remain consistent with the theory that the level of non-audit fees paid to the financial statement auditor appears to a significant factor considered in the assignment of a firm's debt rating by bond analysts.
Median Sample Split
There is some research that suggests it is possible that the primary results could be driven by the sub-segment of our sample with the largest percentage of non-audit services. Hackenbrack and Elms (2002) find abnormal returns only for the firms receiving the highest level of non-audit services while Pany (1995, 1996) find the perception of auditor independence to be affected in loan decisions only for material relationships. To examine this possibility, we split the sample based on the median total fees (TotFee) paid to the external auditor by the audit client and re-perform the analyses. The results, shown in Table 3 , indicate that while the p-value of the TotFee variable for the above-median subsample of firms is slightly lower (p = .021) than for the below-median subsample (p = .057), the fee measure variable remains significant at traditional levels for both samples.
(Insert Table 3 here)
These results, while not as conclusive as the experimental evidence established by Pany (1995, 1996) and those described by Hackenbrack and Elms (2002) regarding the equity market, still indicate that relatively high fees paid to the external auditor can have negative effects on the bond rating decision process. Overall, the results shown in Tables 2 and 3 remain consistent with the theory that the total fees paid to the external auditor are a significant factor in the bond rating decision process.
Classification Accuracy Results
To examine the economic implications of the effects that non-audit fees have on bond ratings, we examine the change that occurs in classification prediction accuracy when the constructed measures of audit and non-audit fees are added to the benchmark bond rating prediction model. We again utilize Equation (1) and execute a jack-knife logistic regression analyses to determine classification accuracy. Our benchmark model results in 65.53% of our sample being correctly predicted indicating a robust model and comparing very favorably with prior bond rating research results. Importantly, the addition of the constructed audit and nonaudit fee measures does not increase the resulting classification accuracy. While it should be noted that it can be difficult for incremental variables to significantly improve the classification accuracy of a robust prediction model, these results fail to indicate any clear economic importance of the audit fee variables in the ultimate determination of a firm's debt rating.
Similarly, when the unexpected (surprise) portion of the non-audit fee measures from the 2001 disclosures are incrementally added to the benchmark model, the results remain the same, i.e. a failure to clearly ascribe a material economic effect to the non-audit fee measures in the determination of a firm's debt rating.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The overall results presented here are consistent with the interpretation that the total amount of fees paid to a firm's external auditors are incorporated as a significant factor in bond rating analysts decision process. The results also indicate that, in a decomposition of total fees paid to the auditor, non-audit service fees appear to be the most important component. However, it needs to be recognized that these results are not corroborated by an increase in classification accuracy.
The effects of providing non-audit services to audit clients on the perception of auditor independence and audit quality have been widely debated. The availability of audit and non-audit fee data provides an opportunity to investigate the effects of non-audit services as proxies for the auditor independence aspect of perceived audit quality. Recent evidence has provided mixed results on the issue of whether non-audit services may be associated with a reduction in perceived audit quality by investors. Our study adds to the extant literature by providing evidence regarding the effects of providing non-audit services to audit clients on a firm's bond rating. We provide empirical support regarding the systematic incorporation of non-audit fee information into the bond rating process. Our results indicate that the magnitude of non-audit fees paid to the external auditors is negatively associated with a firm's bond rating. Employing these measures as established proxies for auditor independence, our results provide empirical evidence regarding bond rating analysts' perceptions of audit independence. However, it is important to recognize that we are unable to document a significant economic effect on the ultimate bond rating assigned to a firm indicating a marginal practical effect.
Bond ratings provide a particularly useful capital market setting in which to examine the effects of non-audit fees paid to external auditors. When bond rating analysts are preparing to make a prediction of the probability of default risk for a particular firm's bonds, they rely considerably on the information extracted from audited financial statements in order to provide input to the financial ratios that help them perform a fundamental analysis of the firm. Our research complements the research conducted in the equity markets and provides additional insights into the effects of relatively high non-audit fees paid to external auditors on the bond rating process. These findings should be of interest to those parties concerned with the perceived independence of the audit process, as well as those interested in the affects of perceived audit quality on the bond rating process.
Recent legislation (i.e. the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) has been enacted that relates to external auditors providing additional services to their clients. The act specifically identifies nine non-audit services that may not be performed by incumbent auditors, including;
bookkeeping, financial information systems design and implementation (only if it is reasonable to conclude that the results will be subject to audit), appraisal or valuation services, actuarial services, internal audit, management functions or human resources, investment services, legal services, and expert services unrelated to the audit (i.e. advocacy services). In response to such requirements, many firms have eliminated their information technology consulting units (Fisher 2002) . However, while the act limits the type of services that may be provided, there are no limits on the amount of fees that may be generated from services that do not meet the specific requirements of the act. Given the evolving legislation and recent changes initiated by the firms, it is likely that the fee structures of the audit firms will change. It will be useful to monitor and examine the effects these changes have on the perception of auditor independence and audit quality. Our results from the bond market, in addition to research conducted in the equity markets, should help provide a point of reference to which future research findings can be compared as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act matures and evolves in practice. The 5-year average of a firm's total assets. TotAsset Natural log of 5-year average of total assets. Long Term Debt
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